On 17th March the African Union announced the imposition of sanctions on Andry Rajoelina and 108 other members of the Haute Administration de Transition (HAT), the military and the Haute Cour Constitutionelle (HCC). The measures included restrictions on visas for travel and the freezing of assets overseas. The move was seen as of limited potential impact and as more of a political gesture, which Rajoelina derided, and Jean Ping, the head of the African Union (AU), said later that the restrictions needed the support of members of the Security Council of the United Nations to be effective; France in particular had been apparently ambivalent. Certain members of the HAT called for sanctions to be imposed as a reprisal on the leaders of the opposition movements, as well as on any foreigners seen to be interfering in Malagasy affairs, in what was an allusion to the US and its ambassador but which also reflected an unfortunately increased level of xenophobia in the country. The European Union is considering further sanctions against the régime.
On
18th March the International Crisis Group, a leading organisation
involved in resolving conflicts, suggested that mediation efforts should stop
trying to implement a transitional power-sharing deal and instead aim for an
agreement on drafting a new constitution, a referendum on that
document, free and fair elections and the clarification of the terms of amnesty
agreed in Maputo. The Group criticised both the HAT for its refusal to implement
the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords and also the lack of will to compromise of
the other protagonists, ‘who are more concerned about securing the spoils of
power than finding a solution in the national interest’.
There
were violent clashes on the streets of the capital on 18th and 19th
March between the security forces and protesters from the Madagascar Movement, a
number of whom were arrested.
The
rival factions were again divided on the creation of a new Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), as the parties of
the three former presidents did not acknowledge its legitimacy and did not
submit names for the three positions to which they were entitled. Only sixteen
of the possible nineteen members of the new Commission took an oath on 31st
March. In early April Monja Roindefo, the former prime minister, said that CENI
could not work as it was biased to a single movement.
The rôle of the army has again been important
recently. Marc Ravalomanana provoked an angry response from Prime Minister
Camille Vital on 24th March when he suggested in an interview on
Radio France Internationale that he could return to Madagascar at will and that
elements of the army were still loyal to him; Vital said that if Ravalomanana
wanted war, he would have it, and that he was ready to die for his country,
whether against forces of the SADC or others. He also said that the majority of
politicians only think of their own interests once elected. General Noël
Rakotonandrasana, the Minister for the Armed Forces, said the former president
should avoid such provocation. On 26th March the Comité militaire de
défense nationale (CMDN) met with Rajoelina and complained of various initiatives
taken without their consent - the HAT had created a number of new military
units, including the Brigade de sécurité intérieure and the Forces
d'intervention special (FIS). General Rakotonandrasana denied on 30th
March that the meeting he had convened between members of the military to
advise the HAT was a prelude to a coup d’état. However, a commander in the FIS
said there was an attempt on 2nd April to seize the presidential Palais
d’Ambohitsorohitra.
The
commemoration at Ambohijatovo in the capital of the events of 29th
March 1947 was the scene of clashes. Rajoelina, Vital and Organès Rakotomihantarizaka, the Minister of Interior Security, met a
hostile reception; the police used tear gas; and the HAT announced an enquiry
into the incidents, and promised arrests. Rajoelina spoke at the ceremony of
his determination to serve the country and to continue with plans for the
Fourth Republic.
Alain Joyandet, the French Secretary
of State for Co-operation and Francophone countries, and André Parant, an
adviser to President Sarkozy, visited Madagascar on 31st March, and
emphasised the need for elections to be held as early as possible, a position
closer to that of the HAT than the opposition. The visit also stimulated
speculation on a probable meeting between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, which the
latter at first dismissed as divisive.
Members of the various churches held
a sixth prayer meeting on 6th April at which its directors said they
would take a more active but peaceful part in resolving the crisis, and pledged
to press in particular for the release of political prisoners. Women members of
the Madagascar Movement held protests on 9th April in which they
called for the release of thirty detainees, which the Minister of Justice
refused.
On 7th April Prime
Minister Vital announced that he would assume the duties of the Minister for
the Armed Forces, General Rakotonandrasana, who refused at first to step down
(and finally handed over office on 14th April); Vital was duly
promoted from his rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier General. In the meantime
he has yet to announce the formation of a new government, supposed to be of
national unity, which was due by the end of March.
The HAT on 9th April made
a further change to the senior ranks in the country in replacing Noro Robinson
Andriamarolahy with Max Ramilison as the President of the Conseil d’Etat (which
provides legal advice to the executive and is the administration court of last
resort). The move seemed to stem from frustration at the Court’s refusal to
allow various changes proposed by the HAT, such as the replacing of ambassadors
appointed by Ravalomanana, who had appointed Andriamarolahy. While Ramilison said he would be
independent, he is reported to be close to Norbert
Lala Ratsirahonana, a special adviser to the HAT.
The régime came under pressure from
the heads of the army in a meeting they held with Rajoelina on 12th
March, in which the generals demanded from the HAT within 48 hours a clear
road-map for the way to find a solution to the crisis by the end of April,
without specifying what the consequences might be if there was not one. Rajoelina
said on 14th April that he had written to President Sarkozy to
accept a proposal from France, South Africa and the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) that would form such a road-map. In particular, he agreed to
Ravalomanana’s participation in talks, and it seems likely that a meeting
between the two of them will now take place. The probable venue is South Africa
on 25th April, and the meeting is also due to include the former
presidents Albert Zafy and Didier Ratsiraka.